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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES MONTHLY REVIEW

23 February 1978

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
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Limiting Conventional Arms Transfers to the South Asian
Subcontinent: Problems and Prospects

US efforts to curb international transfers of conventional arms face a particularly demanding challenge in South Asia. First, regional tensions are exacerbated--and the dynamics of the arms transfer process rendered more complex and resilient--by the East-West and Sino-Soviet rivalries. Second, US global policy objectives--including regional stability, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights--complicate attempts to reduce conventional arms buildups.

* * *

South Asia is dominated by the traditional enemies, India and Pakistan, and the degree of hostility between these two nations has historically dictated the political temperature of the subcontinent. Both states perceive the need for developing sizable military forces to assure their territorial integrity and to enhance national status both internally and externally.


Under these circumstances, both India and Pakistan have sought powerful outside backers with whom their vital national interests coincide. By the early 1960s, Indian leaders were turning toward Moscow to offset the threat they perceived from China. Their mutual concern with preventing the extension of Chinese influence in South Asia still serves as the basis for the alliance between New Delhi and Moscow that was formalized in the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.

As New Delhi's relations with Moscow warmed, Pakistan's leaders discovered that China shared their interest in opposing India. Friction over the disputed border between India and China augmented Peking's desire to curb Soviet influence in neighboring regions, making

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China a natural ally in Pakistan's struggle to curtail India's growing power.*

Iran, too, has an interest in strengthening Pakistan that stems from Tehran's apprehension about the Soviet Union's growing influence in South Asia and its concern about the tribal separatism that reaches into Iran's eastern border regions as well as into Pakistan. Furthermore, although India is the most powerful nation in South Asia at present, Iran, by reason of wealth and burgeoning military might, is emerging as a potential challenger for regional dominance. Pakistan's uncertainty over Iran's long-term foreign policy goals has been largely overridden by its immediate need for support.

Critical Asymmetries

Regional hostilities in South Asia that reflect--and are reinforced by--the Sino-Soviet dispute promise to be stubborn obstacles to limitation of arms transfers to the region. However, problems arising from the differing capabilities, vulnerabilities, and perspectives of India and Pakistan themselves seem likely to prove no less vexing.**

India is a major arms purchaser deriving most of its military imports from the Soviet Union. In addition, it has a growing capacity to manufacture armaments,

**The developing Sino-Pakistani friendship was given added impetus by the US support of India in the Sino-Indian border war and Washington's decision in the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war to discontinue arms shipments to both South Asian powers.*

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primarily under Soviet licensing arrangements.* Although the growth and improvement of India's armed forces depend on substantial direct imports of sophisticated weapons, its domestic defense industry gives it a significant degree of arms independence.

Security concerns grounded in the unresolved conflicts with China and Pakistan provide the principal motivation for India's efforts to build up its military capabilities. New Delhi also regards maintenance of its military preeminence in South Asia as essential to the realization of its aspirations to leadership in the region and the Third World. As a result, Indian spokesmen firmly oppose initiatives that might restrict New Delhi's ability to acquire arms. They have, however, welcomed Washington's efforts to limit US conventional arms transfers, since US restraint effectively favors India by reducing Pakistan's access to Western military equipment while leaving Indian production and acquisitions largely unfettered.

Since the present Indian Government acceded to power in March 1977, it has attempted to rebalance its non-alignment and reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union, including diversifying its sources for advanced weapons. Of significance in the latter regard is New Delhi's contemplated purchase of deep penetration fighter-bombers from a Western supplier. The major contenders are the UK, France, and Sweden. Already, UK spokesmen have informed US diplomats that if India chooses the British Jaguar, London will approve the sale because of its potential importance to the British economy.

An Indian decision to acquire sophisticated Western combat aircraft could reopen the issue of selling similar American fighter-bombers to Pakistan. Although New Delhi claims that the new aircraft are needed primarily to counter China, Islamabad could see such an acquisition as directed against itself as well. In any event, Indian purchase of deep penetration fighter-bombers would shift the regional military balance further in India's favor

**India also imports and manufactures armaments under license from Western countries, e.g., the UK and France.*

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and effectively undermine US arguments that the sale of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan would introduce a new level of arms sophistication into the region.

For its part, Pakistan derives most of its military equipment from foreign sources. It receives military assistance from the People's Republic of China and has purchased sophisticated equipment from other Western countries, primarily France.

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
Although the prestige attached to the possession of advanced armaments undoubtedly attracts Pakistan's leaders, their demand for materiel is due in large part to fear of India, augmented by apprehension about possible subversion sponsored by Afghanistan or the Soviet Union. Islamabad's sense of vulnerability to India--which is heightened by that country's demonstrated nuclear capabilities--precludes Pakistani support for conventional arms transfer (CAT) restrictions that could seriously limit its ability to acquire military hardware while leaving India's domestic defense production relatively unhampered. Pakistan is, however, loath to align itself with India--or to offend the US, which Islamabad views as a potential source of military and political support. Hence, its statements on CAT restraints tend to be carefully balanced in order to preserve Islamabad's room for maneuver.

Conflicting US Objectives

The US has a number of important global interests that it seeks to protect and advance in the subcontinent. The limitation of conventional arms transfers is one of these. Other related objectives include the promotion of regional stability, the restriction of Soviet influence, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the advancement of human rights and the maintenance of a constructive dialogue with the developing nations. Under certain circumstances some of these broad objectives can conflict with one another. Indeed, the regional peculiarities and asymmetries cited above confront US policymakers

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with some particularly vexing dilemmas in their efforts to regulate arms transfers to the South Asian subcontinent. Some of these are suggested below.*

Regional Stability: There is a danger that efforts to curb the flow of arms to South Asia could exacerbate the existing military imbalance between India and Pakistan and therefore prove to be destabilizing.** India's substantial domestic military industry already gives it a significant degree of arms independence. Its major supplier, the USSR, considers arms transfers to be an important foreign policy tool and thus would probably be slow to negotiate away its flexibility in this field. Moreover, even if Moscow were to cooperate in limiting such transfers, the result might be to encourage India to accelerate its drive to produce, and perhaps to export, sophisticated weapons.

Pakistan, in contrast, has little domestic production capability. Arms transfer restrictions could therefore seriously affect its defense program. While China would be unlikely to join any generalized CAT limitations, its ability to underwrite Islamabad's defense requirements is already strained. Peking would probably be unable to meet the shortfall, especially of sophisticated items, if other traditional sources of arms (e.g., France) were denied to Pakistan. Under these circumstances, Islamabad might seek to increase its arms purchases from suppliers that are likely to resist US pressures to restrict arms sales, such as Yugoslavia, Brazil, North Korea, and South Africa. Such an effort would not offset qualitative Indian advances, even if quantities were sufficient.



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***It is possible, of course, that a marked deterioration in Pakistan's position could have the opposite effect, i.e., it could impel Islamabad to subordinate its grievances and parochial interests to the objectives of maintaining peaceful relations with its larger neighbor. Nevertheless, this would seem to be unlikely, at least in the short term.*

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Soviet Influence: While the US may draw some reassurance from the fact that Pakistan's arms-based dependency on China is likely to remain limited by resource constraints on both sides, the same does not hold true of the India-USSR relationship. Unless Soviet cooperation can be secured, attempts to limit arms sales to South Asian countries might only make India more dependent on Soviet arms, thus complicating efforts to reduce Moscow's influence in the subcontinent.

Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan's sense of security is critical to US efforts to halt or slow the spread of nuclear weapons. Unless offset by compensatory moves, restriction of Pakistan's ability to acquire conventional arms would add urgency to Islamabad's desire to develop nuclear weapons. Fear of India would be the primary motive, although a sense of diminished national status would play a role as well. Pakistan regards its nuclear program as a long-term political and strategic counter to India's demonstrated nuclear capabilities. In addition, the Pakistanis may hope that if their country became the first Islamic state to develop nuclear weapons, its status within the Muslim world would be enhanced and the closeness of its ties with the Arab oil states that underwrite Islamabad's weapons imports would increase accordingly.*

In contrast, CAT restraints would probably have little effect on India's nuclear policies and program. New Delhi has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it describes, like past proposals for generalized CAT restraints, as "discriminatory." India, having detonated a "peaceful" nuclear device, has demonstrated its potential for developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, its incentives for pursuing this option are diminished by the ability of its conventional arms industry to ensure India's continued regional preeminence even if the Soviet Union were to participate in regional CAT restraints.

**If this were to occur, one of Pakistan's major creditors, Libya, would probably demand that Islamabad share its nuclear weapons and technical expertise with its Arab benefactors, particularly Tripoli. Pakistan would in all likelihood be unwilling to do so, but it might take advantage of the situation to demand more generous access to arms and funds from other nations as its price for refusal.*

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Human Rights: Respect for human rights is by law one of the criteria for eligibility to receive US arms. Under the circumstances that prevail in South Asia, however, the need to avoid potentially destabilizing disparities in military power may complicate rigid adherence to this rule. The resultant inconsistencies could generate considerable confusion and resentment.

Indian leaders accept--and even welcome--US unilateral CAT restraints. Nevertheless, the new Indian Government could regard its overwhelming popular mandate, its more positive attitude toward the West, and its impressive human rights record as qualifying it to acquire conventional arms under US policy and would probably be deeply aggrieved by any US moves to curtail its ability to acquire arms from other suppliers. Indian indignation would be heightened if it appeared that Washington were according favored treatment to Pakistan.*

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Nonetheless, before deciding on a course of action, the US will have to weigh the costs--including the loss of remaining leverage--of further curtailing Western military sales to Pakistan. It will also have to take into account the probability that denial of conventional arms to Pakistan would heighten its sense of insecurity and could therefore prompt Islamabad to tighten internal controls. On the other hand, the sale of arms to Pakistan

**For a further discussion of India's human rights record, see "India: Restoration of Human Rights" elsewhere in this issue.*

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[redacted] would raise questions about the credibility of the US human rights policy in South Asia and among LDCs in general.

The promotion of rural development and the satisfaction of basic human needs are natural corollaries to the US objectives in the field of human rights--as well as regional stability. In the case of Pakistan, at least, regional tensions and insecurities might prevent realization of this goal. Pakistan's fears of India are such that it might feel pressed to seek redress at any cost--and divert scarce funds to its nuclear program--rather than channeling resources into development projects. In any event, Islamabad, like most LDCs, views advanced armaments as an important benchmark of modernization and does not share the Western perception of rural development as a primary concern.

North-South Tensions: CAT restraints of the type the US would like to see adopted in South Asia enter into the overall North-South dialogue because LDCs generally view them as discriminatory and as focusing on a peripheral aspect of the international arms race.

India shares this perspective, but because its overall approach to the North-South dialogue is firmly grounded in longstanding policies and aspirations, New Delhi's multilateral role is unlikely to be greatly affected by US CAT decisions or initiatives. The Indians will undoubtedly continue to express their unequivocal opposition to a generalized restriction of conventional arms transfers to LDCs in such international forums as the forthcoming UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. New Delhi's positions on unrelated North-South issues--e.g., the common fund, debt relief, and transfer of technology--can be expected, however, to reflect its broader interests.

Pakistan's approach to the North-South dialogue, on the other hand, could become more intransigent if its attempts to acquire sophisticated conventional weapons are effectively frustrated by US-induced constraints on suppliers. At present, Islamabad seeks to balance its effort to court favor with China and within LDC caucuses

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by moves designed to win conservative goodwill. Washington's refusal to sell Pakistan A-7s last year dampened Pakistani hopes of securing tangible US support. Continued rejection of such requests might erode a major incentive for continued Pakistani equivocation on contentious North-South issues. Under these circumstances, pressure or encouragement from such key supporters as Libya might prompt Islamabad to take a less flexible position in negotiations with the industrialized states.

Outlook and Implications

The above discussion is not exhaustive. Additional considerations, such as the US desire for Pakistan's cooperation in stemming the flow of narcotics from South Asia, also play a role. On the whole, regional imbalances compounded by great power rivalry created significant local resistance to the regulation of conventional arms by supplier or consumer arrangements.

Unilateral US CAT limitations could prove increasingly costly and counterproductive under these circumstances, unless steady progress is made toward winning the cooperation not only of the major arms suppliers but of India and Pakistan as well. Moreover, such progress will in itself entail tangible costs for the US, since trade-offs will be needed to counter the disadvantages that will accrue to both the sellers and the recipients if multilateral CAT restrictions are instituted. The political and economic costs of some potentially effective options (e.g., security guarantees) could prove prohibitive. Thus, the outlook for curtailing conventional transfers to South Asia is not promising. Nevertheless, financial constraints are likely to keep India's and Pakistan's share of overall LDC conventional arms transfers at a modest level.

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
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Individual LDC Perspectives on Conventional Arms
Transfer Restraints: Nigeria and Pakistan



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Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous and powerful black African country--a leader, by virtue of its size and resources, within its region and the Third World. It views a capable military establishment as a natural adjunct to this leadership role, lending weight to its voice in international forums, particularly on southern African issues. It has a modest capacity to produce small arms and ammunition, but relies on imports for heavier equipment. As a consequence of the cutoff of new US and British arms following the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967, Lagos turned to the Soviet Union for jet fighter aircraft and other heavy weapons. More recent purchases have been made from West European countries, especially the United Kingdom.

The small West African nations that are Nigeria's neighbors pose no significant military threat. Thus, since the civil war, and particularly during the last two years, Nigeria has been only a light spender in the international arms market. Nevertheless, frictions with

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these neighbors exist, and it is unlikely that Lagos would be willing to allow significant erosion in its military superiority in the region.

The military's role in internal politics is probably a more important determinant of Nigeria's decisions on arms acquisitions and one that will lead it to spend more heavily for weapons during the coming months. In anticipation of its promised return to the barracks by 1979, the military regime is pushing a program of reequipping the Army. Although aspiring civilian politicians have called for a reduction in the Army's size, none of them will pose a serious challenge to the strength and influence of the armed forces in the foreseeable future. Military officers favor the acquisition of modern equipment as important in maintaining the power and prestige of a smaller military establishment; civilians will concur in order to keep the military content.

Nigeria's strong commitment to black majority rule in southern Africa has made it an arms supplier as well as a recipient. It has sent small quantities of materiel to Angola and to the guerrilla movements based in the other frontline states.

Although Nigeria favors moderate tactics in the North-South dialogue (that is, an avoidance of confrontations and conflicts), it supports, as a long-time goal, a major restructuring of what it contends is a discriminatory global political-economic system. Applying this to arms control and disarmament, Nigeria has criticized the superpowers for being the main protagonists of the arms race and rejects controls of arms transfers that primarily affect the LDCs. It has been active in disarmament debates at the UN General Assembly, and in the most recent session it introduced a resolution calling on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a comprehensive program for disarmament to the SSOD.

Lagos will almost certainly view any new US attempt to restrict conventional arms transfers (CAT) as yet another act of discrimination directed against the less developed countries. It would see it as an effort to divert attention from the superpowers' military spending, an unwarranted infringement on the right of LDCs to acquire the means to defend themselves, and a blow to its

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own ability to maintain its leadership within Africa and the Third World.* Nigeria revealed its opposition to CAT restraints at the 1976 UN General Assembly, when it seconded the Indian motion that killed the Japanese proposal to study the subject.

Nigeria is an active and influential spokesman for LDCs in global councils and can be expected to be one in future discussions on CAT restraints. As a member of the nonaligned movement's contact group that deals with disarmament issues, it has already participated in preparing position papers for the SSOD. There is little prospect that it will use this position of leadership to do anything but oppose CAT restraints. This would be particularly true of US initiatives, which would probably be associated in the minds of Nigerian leaders with the arms embargo during the civil war. In any case, to support restraints would run counter to too many interests--involving West Africa, southern Africa, and the non-aligned movement--that Lagos deems important.

Pakistan

Pakistan is totally dependent on outside suppliers for major military equipment. Since the US suspended its arms supplies to South Asia in 1966, Pakistan has relied on the People's Republic of China for military assistance, including tanks and aircraft. Islamabad has turned to other countries, particularly France and North Korea, for items that were either too sophisticated or not available in sufficient quantity from Peking. Funds for these purchases have been provided by Pakistan's Islamic supporters in the Middle East, notably Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.

Although the prestige attached to advanced armaments undoubtedly attracts Pakistan's leaders, their demand for military equipment is primarily due to fear of India. This fear is grounded in the recurrent Indo-Pakistan wars of the past three decades that culminated in Pakistan's resounding defeat and dismemberment in 1971. Islamabad

**Nigeria sees conventional, not nuclear, weapons as instruments of dominance in West Africa. Another resolution it sponsored at the most recent General Assembly was one declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone.*

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is also concerned about Afghanistan's periodic support of separatist movements among the disaffected tribal population of Pakistan's Baluchistan border region, but it could meet this threat with a reduced military establishment. Because the Soviet Union is heavily involved in military assistance to both of Pakistan's regional enemies, Islamabad regards Moscow as the indirect cause of many of Pakistan's security problems.

Pakistan's sense of vulnerability to India conditions its posture in multilateral forums, where it frequently expounds political views designed to win supporters among the developing states, particularly in the Muslim world. Although Islamabad at times has taken positions designed to win the backing of radical LDCs, its desire to remain on good terms with the US and its dependence on financial and political support from such conservative nations as Saudi Arabia and Iran have limited this tendency. Pakistan also has a proclivity to assume positions that it believes will weaken or embarrass India. Pursuit of these diverse foreign policy objectives accounts for Pakistan's erratic behavior in the North-South dialogue.

Pakistan's multiple political objectives were reflected in its response to the Japanese resolution at the 1976 UN General Assembly calling for a study of conventional arms transfers. Although it abstained from voting on the Indian motion that killed the Japanese resolution, Pakistan criticized the Japanese resolution for lack of balance because of its focus on LDC arms acquisitions rather than on industrial country military production and trade. At the same time, Islamabad attempted to appease the West by expressing willingness to explore the issue of CAT restraints. In doing so, Pakistan may have also hoped that restraints on conventional arms transfers could eventually curb Indian arms acquisitions and help to slow the South Asian arms race that Pakistan is clearly losing. Its immediate objective, however, was to enhance its own ability to acquire arms from foreign sources.

Thus, the US decision in the spring of 1977 not to permit Pakistan to purchase A-7 aircraft placed a damper on Islamabad's hopes of once again securing major military assistance from the US and thereby reduced the incentives for continued Pakistani expressions of openmindedness toward US initiatives on the arms transfer issue.

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The Pakistanis have not, however, entirely given up on acquiring advanced aircraft from the US or from an alternative West European supplier, and prospects for this and other future acquisitions will probably influence Islamabad's attitude toward multilateral arms transfer restraints.

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UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development:
G-77 Expectations and Behavior

The 1979 UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) will be significantly influenced by general trends in North-South politics. Initial LDC receptivity to an "apolitical" emphasis on the application of science and technology to meeting basic human needs is likely to be outweighed by a desire to gain greater access to high technology as a means of achieving equality with the industrialized states. The climate of the conference is thus likely to be more political than technical. Within such an environment, the prospects for a fruitful meeting will reflect LDC perceptions about how willing the industrial states are to meet the overall development needs of poor countries, not only within the UNCSTD but also in other multilateral forums.

* * *

The UNCSTD, scheduled to meet in Vienna in the autumn of 1979, will be the first major global review of the application of science and technology to the development problems of the LDCs. Although global cooperation in science and technology for development would appear to be an apolitical topic, the possession and acquisition of technology have acquired a definite North-South, "have - have not" dimension that will undoubtedly be highlighted at the conference.

The UN resolution in 1976 that called for the UNCSTD established an explicit link between the goals of the conference and the movement toward a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It also reflected an LDC consensus that the conference is a major step toward keeping the responsibility of the industrial states for the development of poor countries at the center of UN attention. International scientific and technological cooperation is expected by the developing nations to reduce the inequalities of economic wealth and opportunity

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among nations. In particular, the developing nations want to use the advanced technology of the industrial nations to enhance their national and collective self-reliance and to reduce the present state of dependency that characterizes most of the Third World.

G-77 Expectations

It is still too early to predict with confidence the specific topics that the developing nations will choose to discuss at the conference. Most LDCs have thus far not focused on the conference because they lack the interest or the personnel and expertise necessary to tackle a national policy paper on science and technology. Nonetheless, it is already apparent that the Group of 77 (the LDC caucus) and the industrial nations do not agree on the terms of reference for the agenda. On the one side, the industrial nations, and the US in particular, want to avoid detailed discussion of such potentially controversial topics as transfer of advanced technology and the role of multinational corporations, which, they argue, are being discussed in other forums. Consequently, they have attempted to focus attention on helping LDCs apply science and technology to meet basic human needs (that is, on the development of technological capabilities).

On the other side, many of the more technologically sophisticated LDCs that have already begun preparations for the conference want to focus on the mechanisms for acquiring and applying technology in order to improve their technological position. These and many of the less advanced LDCs do not generally differentiate between the development of technological capabilities (that is, creating the self-sustaining ability to adapt, innovate, and develop useful technologies for development purposes) and the transfer of specific and often sophisticated technologies to the developing world. Control of the selection and acquisition of technology is seen by the LDCs as an important tool with which to redress what they perceive is a humiliating state of dependence on the industrialized nations. Technology, especially that which promotes economic growth and provides employment through industrialization, is considered by the LDCs to be the key to successful development and modernization--and to achieving commensurate wealth and power.

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A partial compromise was reached in the UN's Economic and Social Council by which the agenda would address three issues of greatest concern to the developing nations,* in the context of five subject areas. These areas, agreed on after much debate at a recent preparatory committee meeting, are: food and agriculture; natural resources and energy; health, human settlements, and environment; transportation and communications; and industrialization. The LDCs, however, intend to minimize the five subject areas and to use them merely to illustrate the three substantive issues.

Despite the attention that the LDCs now appear to be paying to a basic human needs strategy, in the long run as they further develop their national papers and positions, they are not likely to be satisfied with such an approach. In their view, a basic human needs approach does not meet their central concern, which is to acquire greater wealth and political power in the international system. Indeed, the LDCs are likely to become increasingly disturbed by what they perceive as attempts by the US and other developed nations to minimize the important questions of technological dependence and transfer.

Regional as well as national interests will influence the evolution of the LDCs' expectations. Regional groupings play an important role in the dynamics of the Group of 77. Developing nations use the G-77 forum to coordinate their positions on the various NIEO issues. This consensus is formed in interregional and intra-regional consultations, a process that results in a high

**The three issues are: 1) the choice and transfer of technology for development, including the elimination of obstacles to the better utilization of science and technology, methods for integrating technology in economic and social planning, and the development of new technologies; 2) institutional arrangements and new forms of international cooperation in the application of science and technology; and 3) the utilization of the existing UN system and other international organizations to promote the application of technology and development.*

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degree of solidarity among the G-77 members.* In the case of science and technology, the Latin American nations as a group generally have more sophisticated economies and requirements than the less developed nations of the African group. The Asian group falls between, encompassing some of the most advanced (Iran, South Korea, Taiwan) and some of the most backward (Bangladesh) nations.**

The poorer nations of Africa and Asia that generally lack the basic scientific personnel, institutions and the money to buy technology may devote considerable attention to the selection and application of technologies to their primary development needs. The more technologically and economically advanced "upper tier" nations of Latin America and Asia, however, will probably take the lead in formulating national strategies that will enable all LDCs to acquire increasingly sophisticated technologies, including, in some cases, nuclear technology. For example, they may seek concrete agreements with the industrialized nations on the means of transferring technology to developing nations, integrating technology in their development strategies, promoting their own technological innovations, and exporting this new technology to the industrial nations.

International Environment

The environment for the conference and the expectations and behavior of the developing nations will be strongly influenced by the progress (or lack thereof) in discussions of NIEO-related issues in other multilateral forums throughout 1978 and 1979. Of perhaps greatest impact in shaping the expectations and mood of the developing nations and the UNCSTD will be the tone and progress of talks being conducted between developed and developing nations under UNCTAD auspices, in particular those on an integrated program for commodities (including the common fund), debt relief, and a code of conduct

**The position of G-77 coordinator rotates among the three blocs of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Jamaica will be the coordinator in New York until September 1978. The coordinator in Geneva changes every three months.*

***The Middle Eastern countries are included in the Asian bloc.*

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on the transfer of technology. Over the past year, little progress has been made in meeting the demands of the LDCs on these three issues, adding to the G-77's sense of frustration.*

During the year and a half preceding the UNCSTD conference, other opportunities for testing the relative pressures for conflict or cooperation in North-South relations will arise at the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board ministerial-level conference to discuss debt (Geneva, March 1978); the UN Conference on Technological Cooperation Among Developing Countries (Argentina, September 1978); the UN Conference on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology (October 1978);** a negotiating conference on the implementation of the Integrated Program for Commodities (late 1978); the Non-aligned Movement Summit (Cuba, 1979); the UNCTAD V meeting to review progress on the NIEO (Manila, May 1979); and preparations for the World Administrative Radio Conference (late 1979).

The UNCSTD will also be influenced by the smoothness of preparations for that meeting. Major disagreements between developed and developing nations have been at least temporarily averted by the choice of a secretary general from a developing country (da Costa of Brazil), a deputy from a developed country (Gresford of Australia), and a neutral site (Vienna). Representational problems on the preparatory committee that threatened to politicize and delay the preparations have been solved by a decision to open meetings to all UN members. The political maneuvering of Secretary General da Costa to extend his control and influence may continue, however, to plague preparations and increase tensions.

***The fifth preparatory session met on 13-24 February and the sixth session will meet on 26 June - 7 July 1978.*

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G-77 Behavior: Cooperation or Confrontation

Those G-77 members that intend to play a leading role in the UNCSTD--Indonesia, Mexico, and Kenya for example--have an active interest in the subject matter and realize that their interests in acquiring technology are more likely to be satisfied through cooperation than through confrontation with the industrial nations. These and other moderate nations such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia, support G-77 demands for a NIEO, but their support is often more political than economic; such nations have benefited from the existing international economic system. They have undertaken serious preparations for the conference and have appointed knowledgeable science and education officials to head their delegations. These officials are not likely to raise controversial political issues that could complicate discussions. Nonetheless, in instances where the preparations for and representatives to the UNCSTD overlap with discussions on transfer of technology and other NIEO-related issues, the behavior of these nations at the UNCSTD will be influenced by the state of North-South relations in other UN forums.

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The major economic and political differences both within and among the G-77's three regional groupings place a continual strain on G-77 unity. Nevertheless, the major tactic of the G-77 in approaching the industrialized nations has been to maintain group solidarity. Hence, the group's behavior in any multilateral forum will depend on how smoothly the moderates and the radicals can compromise their differences in reaching a common position. In general the important factors in determining

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
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this behavior are: the degree of commitment of influential moderates and radicals to a particular issue; the roles of the various country representatives; and the position of the industrial nations and how responsive they are perceived to be on a particular issue.

Outlook

In sum, the UNCSTD offers both a topic and forum conducive to discussions along North-South lines. The course of negotiations on other such issues and the prospects for success (or failure) in achieving concrete progress toward key G-77 goals will influence the expectations and attitudes that the developing nations bring to the UNCSTD. Despite the emphasis on preparing individual national papers, the LDCs will approach the UNCSTD as a group and will use the G-77 coordination mechanism to formulate common proposals and to enhance the group's solidarity.

The developing nations' interest in using modern technology to meet their economic and political goals, as incorporated in demands for a New International Economic Order, will be at issue in this conference. Their desires for access to technology and for measures to regulate the practices of multinational corporations, break up the technological monopoly of the industrialized nations, and eliminate barriers to the flow of advanced and proprietary technology will undoubtedly collide with the interest of the industrial nations in protecting the proprietary nature of their technology. Whether the controversial issue of technology transfer becomes a focus of the conference will depend on the progress of the negotiations on an international technology transfer code currently being held under UN auspices. It will also depend on the degree to which the US and other industrial nations can focus LDC attention on the issue of applying science and technology to basic human needs. At this point it would seem that LDC resistance to such a focus will increase as the conference date approaches.



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India: Restoration of Civil Rights

The Janata government was installed over 10 months ago with promises to restore and consolidate civil liberties in India. Prime Minister Morarji Desai's cabinet immediately moved to dismantle portions of Indira Gandhi's emergency rule, permit open political debate, release most political prisoners, and reestablish a free press. But the government was stymied when it came to the more ambiguous aspects of Gandhi's authoritarian legislation. In treating both the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) and the 42nd constitutional amendment, Desai and his colleagues were caught between their desire to have a politically free society respecting human rights and civil liberties and the need of a democratic government to protect itself against extremist threats. The reconciliation of these often conflicting imperatives and the consequent degree to which emergency rule can be dismantled are still being discussed in India. To a significant extent this process and debate can be generalized and projected into the international arena. It could thus prove instructive to both detractors and proponents of the compatibility of human and civil rights with the impulse of states toward domestic stability and external self-preservation.

* * *

Gandhi herself took the first steps--perhaps intended as temporary--to dismantle emergency rule. When she announced in January 1977 that free elections would be held, she ordered that arrested politicians be released, permitted electoral activities on the part of the opposition, and informed the press that censorship was being lifted. Just before leaving office in March, Gandhi restored some of the independence of the judiciary by revoking the internal emergency proclamation of 1975.

It remained for Desai's cabinet to attempt to safeguard India's restored democracy after the Janata Party's stunning electoral victory. The government released most

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of the persons arrested under MISA; by the end of 1977, some 403 remained in prison, down from 6,851 in March. (Of these, 388 were foreigners awaiting expulsion.) An equally small number of people were still being detained under the Defense and Internal Security of India Rules for illicit financial dealings and smuggling. The government has also been slowly releasing those Naxalities from eastern India who agree to give up their insurrectionary methods of protest. (It is not clear if the Naxalites, members of a far left revolutionary group formed in 1967, are being detained under either of the above-mentioned acts or under other constitutional arresting powers of the Indian Government.)

Additionally, Janata moved directly against the alleged arm of Gandhi's authoritarianism, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the cabinet secretariat. RAW has been reduced in size, reformed at the top, and limited strictly to its external intelligence gathering function. To ensure against future aberrations, the new head of RAW will report only to the cabinet secretariat, composed of independent civil servants, rather than to the Prime Minister directly.

The Desai government moved to ensure journalistic freedom by repealing the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable Matter Act, which made censorship legal, and it also returned to reporters their immunity in covering parliamentary debates. Moreover, the new government immediately took up the future of *Samachar*, the unified news agency created by Gandhi to control the press, and appointed a commission composed of journalists to suggest an appropriate revamping of news agencies. The commission, headed by Kuldip Nayer, a respected editor, proposed dividing *Samachar* into three new press services. The report generated much controversy, and in the end, Information Minister Advani opted for returning to the old, preemergency system of four independent and competing agencies. This proposal, introduced in the lower house in December 1977, went into effect on 1 February.

The progress of the Desai cabinet in restoring individual liberties faltered a bit when it had to deal with the conflict existing between the political rights of citizens and the government's need to maintain law and order. Although one of Janata's campaign promises

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had been to take MISA off the books, due to the influence of Home Minister Charan Singh, the act is still in effect. Its content has been modified, however, and persons can no longer be detained for up to two years without being told of the reasons for their arrest; they must now be informed promptly. MISA, incidentally, predates the emergency but became increasingly controversial after June 1975 as a result of its widespread use by Gandhi to silence her opponents.

A similar hesitation about removing the 42nd constitutional amendment that solidified emergency rule also prevails in ruling circles. Desiring to retain some powers of law enforcement in exceptional situations, the government has not yet moved to repeal the amendment, but decided instead to revise it in a limited way. Under the provisions of proposed legislation, Parliament would deprive itself of its unlimited power to identify and prohibit "antinational" organizations, and concomitantly, the old powers of the federal supreme and state high courts to review legislation would be restored. While legislative action is still pending in the upper house, because of complaints that Janata has not lived up to its campaign pledge, Law Minister Shanti Bhushan has assured the public that the remaining articles over which Janata and Congress disagree will be dealt with in future parliamentary sessions. (Congress cooperation is necessary since it still has a majority in the upper house, which must approve all amendments to the constitution.)

On the whole, the Desai government has made ample progress in restoring civil liberties in India. Despite a slowing down of the process in recent months, Janata apparently retains the trust of the electorate in its handling of political freedoms.

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Drug-Related Violence in Latin America

Narcotics trafficking in Latin America is so lucrative financially that drug groups are turning increasingly to violence to counter government efforts to thwart the traffic. This in turn stimulates the government in many cases to more forceful counteractions. The most likely outcome is a stalemate accompanied by increased violence.

Violence has long been associated with narcotics trafficking in Latin America. The potentially large financial profits from this trade have removed from many drug smugglers the compunction against taking human lives, particularly those of enforcement officers. As enforcement operations in Latin America become more sophisticated and efficient, trafficking groups and other organized crime syndicates involved in the illegal drug industry are increasingly resorting to violent counter-measures in order to protect their interests.

Last month a Bolivian drug agent from the Department of Narcotics and Dangerous Substances (DNSP) was lynched in a cemetery in downtown La Paz. A note attached to the murdered official's body stated this was the beginning of the "elimination of narcotics agents" in Bolivia. The murder is undoubtedly a scare tactic by one or more cocaine smuggling groups and is intended as a response to Bolivia's current priority program to end the lucrative cocaine trade through registration of coca growers and increased emphasis on enforcement and interdiction.

Although the DNSP has competent and professional leadership, its staff has traditionally been underpaid and poorly trained. If more DNSP agents are murdered, the reluctance that many enforcement officials already feel about going into parts of Bolivia's drug-oriented hinterland will increase--perhaps to a point where there will be no control at all in certain areas.

In Colombia, the gangs that operate cocaine laboratories and smuggle marijuana are reportedly well armed

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with automatic weapons. Competition for supplies and disputes over prices and operational territory have resulted in frequent gang warfare. This situation has exacerbated Colombia's already serious crime problem and complicated the government's effort to solve the country's social disorders. Efforts over the past year to control the problem have resulted in an increasing number of ambushes and assassinations of National Police and Department of Administrative Security agents assigned to narcotics control. Even judges have been murdered in an attempt by the traffickers to intimidate the judiciary.

Perhaps the most graphic example of violent reprisals by drug traffickers has occurred in Mexico. Apparently pinched by the continuing eradication program, poppy growers in northwestern Mexico have begun firing on government helicopters spraying herbicides. A number of helicopters have been hit, several have been brought down, and at least one pilot has been killed. In addition, steel cables have been strung across mountain valleys, but the aircraft have so far successfully avoided entangling their rotor blades. Although it has not yet been attempted, there is always a possibility that some of the prominent drug groups might employ "commandos" to sabotage the helicopters while they are still on the ground.

Acts of brutality and sabotage may prove embarrassing for the affected countries, but violent retaliation by drug smugglers will not prevent governments from either continuing or escalating their drug enforcement programs. Indeed, the very extent to which traffickers can retaliate against enforcement agencies is limited at the outset.

For example, no matter how well armed they are, no trafficking groups can match military firepower. Heroin traffickers in Culican, the drug smuggling capital of Sinoloa, Mexico, operated with virtual impunity until the armed forces swept through the city late last year. Rampant lawlessness, which the ill-equipped local police had been powerless to stop, ended practically overnight after the aggressive and tough-minded Mexican Army moved in.

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Similarly, Colombian drug traffickers--through their corrupting influence on government officials and their indiscriminate shootouts among themselves and police officers--have exceeded the military's tolerance. As a result, the drug industry in Colombia has been included in an intensified campaign to clean up violence and crime in the country, a campaign that the military command enjoined President Lopez to undertake.

In the long run, however, a type of stalemate will persist. The violent reprisals of the drug smugglers will not dissuade enforcement officials, nor will the efforts of enforcement officials eliminate the traffickers--they both will endure. In the interim, violence will be prevalent, and the loss of life on both sides will be simply one more aspect of the complex and pervasive narcotics problem in Latin America.

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International Terrorism: The Japanese Red Army
Attempts To Return Home

The Japanese Red Army (JRA), a small expatriate terrorist organization responsible for a series of widely scattered and highly publicized operations over the past few years, is apparently shifting its focus from the Palestinian cause and world revolution to Japan in an effort to rebuild its base at home. For example, the JRA sought to court wider support among Japanese leftists by including non-JRA members among the radicals whose release it demanded from Japanese jails during its two most recent operations: the seizure of the US Embassy's consular section in Kuala Lumpur in 1975 and the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines (JAL) plane to Dacca in 1977. During the same period, some 20 JRA members returned to Japan, where they have sought to create a new front organization and strengthen the JRA's ties with various potentially sympathetic groups.

The JRA apparently hopes to build an apparatus that can support the return of the two dozen or so of its seasoned activists who remain overseas. Its tactics and revised platform--which now places first priority on the overthrow of the Japanese Government--seem to have won the approval of a number of small and formerly hostile radical groups in Japan. Nonetheless, the JRA seems unlikely to gain any significant support from either the general public or Japan's orthodox Marxist parties. Hence, the practical effects of this shift in strategy on the organization's capabilities and methods of operation may not be very great.

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Origins

The JRA has been isolated from the mainstream of Japanese politics due to its extremist policies. This state of affairs originated with the public reaction to

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the activities of its parent organization, the Japanese Red Army Faction (RAF),* a splinter group that broke away from the radical Communist League (Kyosando or Bund) in 1969 to advocate worldwide student revolution. The RAF was quickly suppressed by the Japanese authorities, who raided its training site that same year. The police subsequently arrested most of the RAF's members and drove the remainder underground.

Because of the RAF's penchant for violence, popular opinion strongly supported the police measures. Moreover, the hijacking of a JAL jet to Pyongyang in 1970 by nine RAF members further alienated the general public and prompted Japan's orthodox Marxist parties to disavow the group's actions.

In July 1970, an ultraradical wing of the RAF merged with the *Keihin Ampo Kyoto* (the Tokyo-Yokohama Anti-Security Treaty Student Committee) to form the United Red Army (URA). The discovery of the new organization's headquarters by the Japanese police in February 1972 led to the capture of two of its major leaders and revealed that 14 of the URA's original 31 members had recently been tortured and murdered in a bloody purge. The publicity accorded this unprecedented massacre further fueled public outrage, and together with tighter police surveillance, this development made it even more difficult for the extreme left to operate in Japan.

Indeed, domestic setbacks had prompted the RAF to seek an overseas base as early as 1969. In particular, the group turned to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

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As things turned out, however, the Japanese terrorists-in-exile split with the RAF home organization in

**An organization distinct from the European Red Army faction.*

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
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late 1971 due to the latter group's endorsement of the type of severe disciplinary measures employed by the URA. The Beirut-based group announced that its goals were--in order of priority--to support the Palestinian struggle, to promote world revolution, and to overthrow the Japanese Government. Two years later it adopted the name Japanese Red Army.

These Japanese expatriates staged their first overseas terrorist operation, the 1972 Lod Airport massacre, in order to prove themselves to the initially skeptical PFLP. The three terrorists involved received their training at a PFLP camp in Lebanon, obtained forged passports during a stopover in Frankfurt, and were supplied with Czech automatic rifles and Soviet hand grenades in Rome. This incident further alienated Japanese public opinion as well as the majority of the radical left in Japan.

The negative outcry did not, however, deter the nascent JRA. In July 1973, a joint Japanese PFLP commando team hijacked an Amsterdam-to-Tokyo JAL flight, destroying the aircraft on the runway at Benghazi, Libya, after unsuccessfully demanding the release of the JRA survivor of the Lod Airport attack and a \$5 million ransom. Over the next four years, JRA terrorists mounted--or attempted to mount--at least six more major operations in widely scattered parts of the world (see table).

Although the terrorist-trained cadre of the JRA is believed to consist of only about 20 individuals, the organization has used both its own external support apparatus and those of other international terrorist groups to operate on a near global basis.



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JRA INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST OPERATIONS, 1974-1977

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>
January 1974	Singapore	A joint JRA-PFLP team attacked the Shell Oil Refinery as a symbolic strike at oil companies and to protest Geneva talks on the Palestinian situation. The terrorists, trapped for seven days, were allowed to leave after the PFLP seized the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait, where the Ambassador and 16 others were taken hostage. The Japanese Government flew both groups of terrorists to Aden.
July 1974	Europe	Operation Translation, a scheme to kidnap a Japanese consul or corporate representative for ransom, was aborted by the arrest of a JRA activist in France. Both the Paris-based Curriel Apparat, which has given aid to numerous terrorist groups, and the PFLP were involved.
September 1974	Netherlands	The JRA seized the French Embassy to obtain the release of their Paris compatriot. The French paid a \$300,000 ransom and freed the jailed terrorist. Carlos, the Venezuelan PFLP terrorist, was reported to have furnished the weapons used in the attack.

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February 1975	Sweden	Two JRA members were arrested in Stockholm while casing the Lebanese Embassy as a prospective target in pressuring the Lebanese Government to take a more pro-Palestinian attitude. The duo were deported and jailed upon arrival in Japan.
August 1975	Malaysia	The JRA took over the adjoining offices of the Swedish Embassy and the US Embassy's consular section in Kuala Lumpur, forcing the Japanese Government to release the two recently arrested JRA guerrillas and three other members of different Japanese radical factions imprisoned in Japan. The prisoners and terrorists were flown to Libya in a JAL plane.
September 1977	Bangladesh	The JRA hijacked a JAL jet to Dacca, forcing Tokyo to release six prisoners and pay a \$6 million ransom. The terrorists were transported to Algiers on the same plane.

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Domestic Sympathizers

Despite widespread Japanese resentment of the JRA, there are a small number of pro-Palestinian organizations in Japan that have been generally sympathetic to the JRA and have provided it with some support. The most notable are the International Revolutionary Front Information Center (IRFIC), the Jinmin Shimbunsha (People's Newspaper Company), and VZ58--an organization named after the Czech automatic rifle used by the terrorists at Lod Airport.

The IRFIC, founded by the prominent leftist movie director Adachi Masao, has been the domestic propaganda arm of the JRA. The group produced and promoted the film "Red Army - PFLP World War Declaration," a romanticized movie glorifying the Palestinian struggle and its links with the JRA. Adachi left Japan for the Middle East in 1974 to become a member of the Red Army leadership. The IRFIC continues to act as a Red Army public relations organization and is suspected of being in clandestine contact with the JRA terrorist cadre abroad.

The Jinmin Shimbunsha's predecessor organization, the New Left Company, frequently printed JRA material in its publication, *New Left*. The company's name was changed in conjunction with the Japanese Red Army's shift in emphasis. The Jinmin Shimbunsha presently serves as the mouthpiece for JRA policy proclamations.

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Policy Shift

The JRA's interest in consolidating and strengthening its base in Japan first surfaced in March 1975

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when JRA leader Shigenobu Fusako announced plans for the "Japan Council for the World Revolutionary United Front," a leftist coalition dedicated to the overthrow of the Japanese Government as a step toward world revolution. The arena of conflict was not to be confined to Japan, however, for the strategy announced by Shigenobu included plans to subject Japanese overseas commercial and diplomatic installations to terrorist action.

The JRA's decision to focus more on Japan was influenced in part by growing problems in Lebanon--including the Lebanese civil war and PFLP criticism of the JRA for its lack of an effective domestic support apparatus.

The JRA's activities in Japan are now directed by some 20 activists who returned from overseas between late 1975 and mid-1977. Together with their domestic backers, they have become the JRA lobby with the Japanese leftist movement.

The JRA has concentrated on two types of recruitment targets--friends and acquaintances of Red Army members and members of other radical left bodies. In addition to seeking new recruits, JRA activists have sought to use potential sympathizers to build ties to other radical organizations.*

Over the last year or so, the JRA's domestic activities have included: establishing a JRA front organization that has sponsored a series of lectures aimed at the radical left; founding a new pro-JRA body that promotes the causes of the displaced Ainu minority in Japan and of the Palestinian people; and publicizing a more conciliatory line, dubbed the 30 May 77 "Appeal" to the

**The prospective support organization is to be patterned after the Japan Technical Committee to Aid US Anti-War Deserters (JATECH), a covert arm of the Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam Committee) which was active during the Vietnam War. JATECH served as the Japanese underground railroad for American military deserters, providing an efficient infiltration and exfiltration route. There is no evidence available at this time, however, to indicate any success in the development of such an apparatus.*

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Japanese left. In early 1978, the JRA publicly emphasized the need for leftist unity in order to overthrow the Emperor and found a provisional revolutionary government.

Outlook

Although the JRA has had some success in strengthening its domestic infrastructure and winning the endorsement of a few small radical fringe groups, it has made no headway toward gaining broader popular support or overcoming the hostility of Japan's orthodox Marxist parties. Similarly, the limited appeal of its ideological platform has largely stymied its efforts to unify Japan's traditionally fragmented radical left.

This situation seems unlikely to change very much over the next few years. Hence, even though the shift in the JRA's operational focus may make recruitment of new members easier, its direct impact on the organization's capabilities and methods of operation may be rather limited. The inherent weakness of its domestic base--and the watchful eye of concerned police authorities--are likely to continue to limit the JRA's ability to operate at home.

The JRA is thus likely to continue to stage sporadic operations abroad. In this context, its decision to shift its organizational center of gravity to Japan could yield some tangible benefits. Simply put, the JRA may find it easier to secure the sympathy and support of foreign organizations and governments if it is able to establish more credible credentials as a "legitimate" national revolutionary group.

In any event, the JRA can be expected to maintain and, if possible expand, its existing foreign links. Its overseas operations may be directed more frequently against Japanese officials or business interests, but attacks on other targets--whether out of revenge or because of their symbolic significance--will probably be mounted as well. Moreover, the JRA will probably continue occasional attempts to seize non-Japanese hostages in order to increase the Japanese Government's discomfort and willingness to meet its demands. [REDACTED]

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